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»IN VINO METAPHORA«
Nun feieren wir, vereinten Siegs gewiss, 
Das Fest der Feste:
Freund Zarathustra kam, 
der Gast der Gäste,
Nun lacht die Welt, der grause 
Vorhang riss,
Die Hochzeit kam für Licht 
und Finsterniss.
Nietzsche
»If God is dead, everything is permitted.« To a philosopher of the nine­
teenth century, these words must have sounded either like the promise of lib­
eration of the harbingers of an unthinkable catastrophe. With the advent of 
God’s death, atheism spawned a form  of nihilism which, as its most bitter 
critics had predicted, led to a complete lack of conviction in any moral stand­
ards. Friedrich Nietzsche, living as he did in the tumult of this death-blow, 
saw beyond the nihilism of the new atheism inasmuch as he perceived in it 
the possibility for a new breed of human being. If God is dead, Nietzsche 
wrote, the Übermensch is possible. It was this possibility of a world that might 
exist beyond good and evil that Nietzsche predicted and developed in most 
of his work. While it might, and in fact did, seem to many that atheism could 
only produce a moral chaos in the form of nihilism, Nietzsche’s work stands 
as a testimony to the idea that with God’s death something infinitely more 
noble might finally arise, shaking off the weight of a moribund Christian 
tradition and establishing human-kind as the standard or norm for what 
might now  be accomplished.
For Nietzsche then, atheism did promise liberation, although not in the 
form  of nihilism. What it might liberate was a potential inherent in human 
life itself which had been buried under the weight of the life-denying doctrine 
o f Christianity. In this paper, I wish to show one of the forms liberation might 
take after the death of God. I shall be writing about the Dionysian and about 
intoxication (der Rausch). In »In V ino Metaphora«, I wish to affirm that God 
is indeed dead and that new, forbidden and irrational forms of human lib­
eration may now release that human potential which has atrophied for two 
millenia under the censure of decadent Christianity and for a century under 
the m ore recent triumph of nihilism. Nietzsche assaulted not only Christianity 
but also those doctrines which attended its death. With atheism, as Nietzsche 
demonstrates, we have neither to accept nihilism nor a new transcendental. 
However sinful or prohibited it may seem, intoxication opens up and affirms 
a once dormant and human, all too human, potential in the form of an intoxi­
cated will to power.
Nietzsche scholarship has been divided with respect to an interpretation 
of the will to power. On the one hand, philosophers have understood Nietzsche
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as espousing a metaphysical or ontological monism or dualism and, on the 
other, as being a nihilist. The first position has been maintained by Walter 
Kaufmann1 and Jean Granier,2 to name only two, and the second by Arthur 
C. Danto.3 While I cannot argue away the inconsistencies in Nietzsche’s pre­
sentation of the will to power, I shall adopt Sarah Kofm an’s interpretation 
as outlined in Nietzsche et la M étaphore*  Although in most of the above- 
mentioned work, the will to power is seen as Nietzsche’s central doctrine, the 
question of its interpretation does plague most exegetes. One is forced, then, 
to choose between this plurality of readings. In this paper, it is Kofm an’s 
interpretation of the will to power that will serve as a guide.
In her work, Sarah Kofman argues that metaphysics and ontology are 
derivative of Nietzsche’s will to power understood as a psychological and phys­
iological phenomenon. To quote Kofm an:
. . .  one cannot say that Nietzschean psychology is . . .  an ontological method 
for research (Granier, p. 17) since, on the contrary, it is the »essence« of 
being which is constituted by the psychology of each being. In Nietzsche’s 
work, one cannot separate ontology and psychology. Yet it is ontology 
that is subordinated to psychology..  . and not the other way around.5
Thus, my view is simply that Nietzsche rejected, and succeeded in rejec­
ting, an ontological conception of the human person in terms of the will to 
power. There are many who would contest this point and they are welcom e 
to do so. Nietzsche did repudiate a systematic philosophy d la Hegel, but there 
are some passages in his work that would support the ontologisation o f the 
will to power. Nevertheless, Nietzsche himself stated that all ontological and 
metaphysical concepts are derived from  a more fundamental, but empirical, 
source. This source is not, for Nietzsche, something that lies beyond the body, 
the senses or life in its more concrete aspects. It is indeed found in the 
psychology and physiology of every human experience.
»Reason« is the cause of our falsification o f the testimony of the senses. 
Insofar as the senses show becoming, passing away and change, they do 
not lie. But Heraclitus will remain eternally right with his assertion that
being is an empty fiction. The »apparent« world is the only one: the
»true« world is merely added by a lie.®
Nietzsche is quite explicit in his rejection of metaphysics and ontology. 
Both are, for Nietzsche, derivations of more original metaphors engendered 
by the senses. In the above passage from  the Twilight of the Idols, where 
he discusses the genesis of the idea of the so-called »true world«, Nietzsche 
demonstrates how this idea has become as invalid as the notion of the 
apparent world. Both ideas derive from  the body and the senses as motivated
1 Walter Kaufmann: Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ, 4th ed., Princeton Uni­
versity Press, Princeton 1974. See especially pp. 235—246.
2 Jean Granier: Le Problème de la Vérité dans la Philosophie de Nietzsche, Seuil, Paris 1966,
quoted in: Sarah Kofman: Nietzsche et la M étaphore: see below.
8 Arthur C. Danto: Nietzsche as Philosopher, The MacMillan Company, New York 1965. See 
especially pp. 80—81.
* Sarah Kofman: Nietzsche et la Métaphore, Payot, Paris 1972. See especially pp. 175—187.
5 Ibid., p. 180.
8 Friedrich Nietzsche: Twilight oj the Idols, in: The Portable Nietzsche (translated and edited 
by Walter Kaufmann), Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth 1968, pp. 480—81.
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by the will to power, that is, from  a psychology and physiology which are 
more fundamental and yet not ontologically so.
The great novelty Nietzsche discovers is that knowledge itself should be 
referred to life and truth to the will to truth. The Nietzschean question 
is not »What is the essence of truth?« but »What does the will that wills 
truth want?« For the will to truth is, in its turn, only a symbol and 
a symptom.7
The will to truth, ontology, metaphysics are derivative of the senses and 
the metaphors they produce. There is nothing in Nietzsche to which an onto­
logy or metaphysics could correspond: no true world, no Ding-an-sich. What 
remains, and what ultimately defeats a nihilist atheism, is the will to power 
as the creative and metaphorical activity of a body whose senses invent 
a world from  a source which cannot be made adequate to any transcendental 
ground.
In all o f his work, Nietzsche associated the Dionysian with an intoxicated 
form  of the will to power. Dionysus is the god of wine and of the harvest. 
In him, Nietzsche also sees the Ewig-Leidende or that suffering which lies 
at the heart of human existence. Dionysian rituals are re-enactments of the 
dismemberment (Zerbrechung) o f that demi-god himself. Initiates to the cult 
o f Dionysus would drink freely, then engage in dancing and singing, hoping 
by this means to induce Dionysus to appear to them. According to some myths, 
these initiates, in the frenzy of their intoxicated state, would dismember an 
animal or human and proceed to eat it, assimilating the pieces of their once 
dismembered god. The association of the god with suffering is linked to this 
practice o f dismemberment inasmuch as the practice inflicts, not so much 
physical pain, but the pain which results from  what must be interpreted as 
individuation. Dismemberment represents the process whereby the primordial 
unity is torn asunder by the Apollonian principium individuationis. Its value, 
then, is the re-enactment of an event that should be viewed metaphorically. 
Intoxication, in Dionysian festivals, represents the opposite process of disin­
tegration —  the disintegration o f individuals. By means of intoxication, bound­
aries and distinctions imposed by values and norms are broken down. In 
intoxicated states, one reaches the painful realisation that such distinctions 
and values are empty. The resulting identification of the intoxicated Dionysian 
with everything that surrounds him or her is, as Nietzsche puts it, an iden­
tification with »the primal unity, its pain and contradiction«.8
The Birth of Tragedy is not only Nietzsche’s first published book, it is 
also his first fully developed presentation of the Dionysian, a theme that 
would occupy him throughout all of his works. In this its earliest formulation, 
the Dionysian appears as an artistic energy which bursts »forth from nature 
herself, without the mediation of the human artist«.9 It is clearly a metaphys­
ical principle; one of the two forces or drives (Triebe) which make it possible 
for there to be a world at all. As a metaphysical drive, the Dionysian is also 
artistic and Nietzsche himself believed that he had produced a brand of 
aestheticism in his first work. Human artists only tapped the more primordial
7 Nietzsche et la Métaphore, p. 181.
8 Friedrich Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy, in: Basic Writings of Nietzsche (translated and 
edited by Walter Kaufmann), The Modern Library, New York 1968, p. 49.
9 Ibid., p. 38.
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Dionysian forces and were therefore artists only by analogy. Not only was 
the Dionysian an artistic and metaphysical principle, however, it was also 
more fundamental with respect to that other force, the Apollonian. The D io­
nysian was the primal mud out of which could arise the dream world of the 
schönen Schein engendered by the Apollonian drive.
The dialectising of the worlds of intoxication and dreams would not 
remain in Nietzsche’s later work, however. He himself realised that he could 
not affirm the metaphysical principles existed without contradicting his own 
views concerning the illusory character of all ontology and metaphysics. These 
latter were produced by what Nietzsche called the Socratic tendency, or the 
drive towards systématisation and rationalisation: the will to truth. Dionysian 
intoxication became one form  — a more integral one —  of intoxication; the 
Apollonian dream world would have its own brand o f intoxication. Intoxication 
was also no longer specifically associated with drinking. It could be found in 
sexual excitement, »all great cravings, all strong affects; the frenzy o f feasts, 
contests, feasts of daring, victory, all extreme movem ent; the frenzy of cruelty; 
the frenzy in destruction; the frenzy under certain meteorological influences, 
as for example the frenzy of spring; or under the influence of narcotics; and 
finally the frenzy of will, the frenzy of an overcharged and swollen w ill«.10 
In addition, both Apollonian and Dionysian intoxication became modalities 
of an essentially protean will to power in its more creative and noble aspects. 
Yet, while the will to power could take any one of a number of forms, the 
Dionysian still remained one of the more life-affirm ing and artistic o f these.
As a modality of the will to power in one of its healthier aspects, the 
Dionysian shares characteristics with the Apollonian and other nobler mod­
alities. In the first place, it too is creative of the illusions, in the form  of 
metaphors, which give life its meaning and value. Intoxication, as the disinte­
gration of norms and values, is creative o f an identification with everything 
that exists such that a unifying bond is established between all existents; the 
principium individuationis breaks down. This unity is no longer a primal 
one in any metaphysically significant sense; it is the unity of all forms of 
existence and is also an illusion. The second and more important character­
istic of the nobler forms of the will to power is just this life-affirm ing trait 
of Dionysian intoxication. As in The Birth of Tragedy, intoxication allows 
one to affirm those irrational and painful aspects of life through reconcil­
iation. This reconciliation is productive o f a text or a rhetoric in the form 
of musical — in the widest sense of that word — metaphors that may excite the 
entire physiological system of the intoxicated Dionysian. The Dionysian says 
yes to a life in which it discovers suffering —  the motivation, if not the force 
behind much value-creating activity. S/he realises in the experience of intoxi­
cation the arbitrariness of all values, norms, customs and habits and exem­
plifies this understanding in a music o f discord and dissonance. While the 
Dionysian and intoxicated will to power is destructive, this destructive behav­
iour becomes creative in the sense that it obliges one to recognise illusion 
as illusion and to affirm the irrationality of life. There is no good reason, 
as the Dionysian experience shows, for accepting one illusion over another and, 
in the disintegration of all illusion, the Dionysian produces its own —  a rhetoric 
of the body and the senses in the form  of music.
»  ibid., p. sis.
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One may, if one wishes a more contemporary example of this rhetoric of 
music, think of rock music. The parallels between listening to rock and intox­
icated states have certainly been noted by many of its afficionados and 
critics. One writer, remarking on Walter Benjamin’s discussion of intoxication 
(der Rausch) has said: Rock music »renders the bodies of its adepts complete­
ly  m obile and emancipates them from  what is regular and periodical. It 
appears to give pleasure in the adaptation of one’s heart-beat to the beat of 
the musical motor.11 Walter Benjamin saw the effects of intoxication in much 
the same way as Nietzsche. In both, intoxication takes the form of a dis­
integration of the self and of all kinds of values and norms. This disintegration 
or dismemberment is often effected by certain kinds of music — itself an into­
xicant — and results in the emancipation of the body and the senses so that 
these become overtaken by the rythym of the music. In Nietzsche especially, 
the association of intoxication and music — either as an intoxicant itself or as 
one of its effects —  is a strong one.
Nietzsche describes the intoxicated will to power in both psychological 
and physiological terms. He is Baudelaire’s doctor-philosopher who has made 
a forceful study of wine, a kind of double psychology. This study follows upon 
Nietzsche’s view of the will to power as a psychological and physiological force. 
In Dionysian intoxicated states: »the whole affective system is excited and 
enhanced: so that it discharges all its means of expression at once and drives 
forth simultaneously the power of representation, imitation, transfiguration, 
transformation, and every kind o f mimicking and acting«.12 Indeed, intoxi­
cation takes total possession of the body in dancing and singing, the represen­
tation of animals or humans, producing a tremendous synergy — and apotheosis 
of the physical and psychological. It is also no accident that the music of this 
totalising and synergic intoxicated state should be part of a ritual such as a 
Dionysian festival or a rock concert. These occasions provide an opportunity 
for a communal experience of celebration and transformation which only 
heightens their effects and succeeds in removing them from the common and 
everyday. The power ox such communal experience should not be understi- 
mated either artistically or politically.
I have already mentioned that the psychological effect of Dionysian intoxi­
cation serves to break down all kinds of norms and values. There are interesting 
analogies here between Benjamin’s and Nietzsche’s views. The Zerbrechung of 
Nietzsche’s intoxication also exemplifies its primary effect in Benjamin’s work. 
In the latter, however, disintegration has explicitly political implications
I should like to explore further. Once the indiviual has been dismembered 
qua individual, one is able to see its origins in its value for instrumental 
reason. The Lockerung des Ich is a means to breaking down and cognising 
the bourgeois aura of individuation. Further, the intoxicated individual also 
sees through the aura of things, the history of their value in relation to 
capitalism. The everyday and historically conditioned connection between 
man and man, man and him or herself and man and things is thus called 
into question. The values of instrumental reason disintegrate and the possibility 
of salvation, of a life without pathos, can be glimpsed through the mortified 
aura of these values.
11 Norbert Bolz: »Illumination der Drogenszene« in Walter Benjamin: Profane Erleuchtung und 
Rettende Kritik (edited by Norbert Bolz and Richard Faber), Konigshausen und Neumann,
Wurzburg 1982, p. 236.
1! Twilight, p. 519.
12 Vestnik IMS
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For Benjamin, however, intoxication could only have a political signifi­
cance if it were dialectically linked to profane illumination in relation to which 
it was only a Vorschule.
Benjamin transforms the archetypal image of the Dionysian destruction 
of the principium individuationis into a dialectical one: the dialectical 
tearing to pieces of the individual into creature and class subject. As a 
creature, one hopes for redemption, as a class subject, one is committed 
to revolutionary action.13
It would be interesting, however, to analyse the form  of communality 
established in Dionysian rituals —  whether ancient or contemporary. While 
Nietzsche and Benjamin neglect to study this aspect of intoxication, concen­
trating solely on the individual’s solitary experience of intoxication, their ideas 
concerning the effects of intoxication would appear to sanction an analysis 
of it as an instance of a kind of primitive solidarity. The breaking down of 
ties, bonds, habits, customs, norms and values — perhaps nowhere better seen 
in its Dionysian splendor that at Woodstock — creates a sense of shared expe­
rience which could be precursor to institutionalised forms of political and 
revolutionary action. Certainly the more vocal detractors of the rock music 
experience all share this fear to a certain extent. Peace and love as voiced 
by the hippies on L. S. D. 25 still hold some promise and continue to engage, 
if only marginally, all those of us who may have gone on to become life  in­
surance salespeople. That governments and individuals in ancient Greece and 
more contemporary times have expressed concern over everything from  the 
length of the hair of the initiates to the lyrics of their music certainly speaks 
for the political aspect of the experience of intoxication be it through music 
or drugs.
In terms of its artistic significance in Nietzsche’s work, intoxication was 
divested of some of its artistic value as Nietzsche continued to reassess the 
Dionysian force or drive. Intoxication, in either its Dionysian or Apollonian 
forms, becomes one, among other, artistic and intoxicated activities. This newer 
conception of the Dionysian artist accords well with Nietzsche’s more developed 
views of the will to power as protean. Indeed, it would appear that the Diony­
sian in art can be surpassed and this by means of »the great act of will, the 
will that moves mountains, the frenzy of the great will which aspires to art«.14 
This greater will is that which produces architecture —  the highest artistic 
expression of the will to power. However, in those passages where the Diony­
sian and the Apollonian lose some of their value with respect to artistic acti­
vity, it is not clear that Nietzsche means to deprecate Dionysian music. He 
seems rather to want to enhance another aspect of the intoxicated Dionysian. 
Music and the Dionysian continue to be closely linked in the idea of the Diony­
sian artist and yet the Dionysian may take yet another form. This later form, 
while not incompatible with its artistic one, makes Dionysus more than simply 
a vehicle for music.
The new conception of the Dionysian associates it with scepticism and 
the playful, mocking behaviour of an illusion-producing demi-god who knows 
itself to be illusion-producing. Dionysus grows in wisdom and appears in
13 «-Illumination der Drogenszene«, p. 237.
14 Twilight, p. 520.
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Beyond Good and Evil in the mask of a philosopher and Nietzsche’s teacher. 
In the tearing down of values and norms — the activity of the destructive Dio­
nysian — in the unmasking of illusion and the mask of illusion Nietzsche dis­
covers his protophilosopher. He appears there as Silenus, Dionysus’ teacher, 
a figure which may also be found in The Birth of Tragedy. The rhetoric of 
nihilism is indeed overcom e in the disintegration of our human, all too human, 
illusions and in the affirmation of life in its illusion-generating forms of the 
will to power. The Emperor knows that he wears no clothes and yet feels no 
shame. Dionysus is reduced in the end to a mask which, and importantly so, 
knows itself to be one. Nihilism is defeated, not by attempting to find a new 
transcendental ground for values, but in the generation of a plurality of 
grounds, metaphors and illusions. The important thing is not to deny nihilism 
but to push it to its limits. As Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good and Evil:
. . . whoever has really, with an Asiatic and supra-Asiatic eye, looked into, 
down into the most world-denying of all possible ways of thinking — beyond 
good and evil and no longer, like the Buddha and Schopenhauer, under 
the spell and delusion of morality — may just thereby, without really 
meaning to do so, have opened his eyes to the opposite ideal: the ideal of 
the most high-spirited, alive and world-affirming human being who has not 
only come to terms and learned to get along with what is, but who wants 
to have what was and is repeated into all eternity, shouting insatiably 
da capo — not only to himself but to the whole play and spectacle but at 
the bottom who needs precisely this spectacle — and who makes it neces­
sary because he needs himself and makes himself necessary.15
The dreadful abyss of noon, the great noon of which Zarathustra spoke 
is indeed just this approach o f the paradoxical silenus —  Dionysian. If he is 
destructive, barbaric and anarchic, it is only because, as Dionysian, he must 
shatter the old tablets and sound out the old gods with a tuning fork until 
the source of all values has been discovered. Dionysus, though a mask himself, 
also makes possible the stripping away of all masks. In Dionysian intoxication, 
the source o f all value-creating activity is laid bare and without shame. Nihi­
lism, pushed to its limits, is just this discovery, the approach of the great 
noontide of a human life which needs only itself to create values and meanings. 
Beyond nihilism lies the laughter, dance and song of Dionysus — the god of 
wine, fertility and life itself.
15 Friedrich Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, in: Basic Writings of Nietzsche, loc. cit., p. 258.
